Kontrola pravorijeka i važnost novootkrivenih činjenica by Tibor Várady
CONTROL OF ARBITRAL AWARDS AND THE 
RELEVANCE OF NEWLY DISCOVERED FACTS
Prof. Dr. Tibor Várady * UDK: 347.918
 347.958:347.918
 Izvorni znanstveni rad
 Primljeno: listopad 2011.
The question has emerged whether facts that become known belatedly may or 
may not justify a recourse against arbitral awards. The focus of this article is on 
the question whether newly discovered facts could and should be heeded at a moment 
when the two generally accepted avenues of court control (setting aside and opposi-
tion to recognition and enforcement) are not accessible anymore. Attention has been 
devoted to several procedural settings (outside those of annulment and recognition) 
which may yield a third recourse within which newly discovered facts may become 
relevant. Such settings are reconsideration or revocation in case of fraud, collateral 
attack on the award, and revision. Such third recourses have not (yet) gained wide 
acceptance. The most important third recourse is revision, and Swiss practice ap-
pears to be the most important practice with regard to revision. After an analysis 
of various arguments and of practical experience, the conclusion is reached that the 
dangers opened by a third recourse might outweigh its benefi ts.  
Keywords: newly discovered facts, court control of arbitral awards, collateral 
attack on the award fi nality, revision
I. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING FACTS AND 
THE SCOPE OF COURT CONTROL OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
In one of his excellent articles devoted to international commercial arbi-
tration, Professor Sajko focuses on recognition and enforcement of annulled 
awards. Pointing out various scholarly approaches, he raises the question 
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whether doctrinal interpretations would have an effect on Croatian jurispru-
dence. Professor Sajko observes that “[t]his depends on the jurisprudence itself 
- ‘la doctrine propose, mais la jurisprudence dispose’”1. The question I would like 
to raise in this paper is what could the doctrine propose, and how can juris-
prudence dispose with the unknown (or, more precisely, unknown at the right 
moment). Speaking of the unknown, I am, of course, referring to facts that 
are not known at the time of the decision making, and I shall stay within the 
context of court control of arbitral awards - which is the context of the article 
of  Professor Sajko cited above.
Let me mention fi rst that the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards 
typically does not extend to fact-fi nding. Redfern and Hunter explain that 
while there is a general interest tied to proper interpretation of legal rules, there 
can be “[n]o such general interest in the fi ndings of fact of a particular tribunal in a 
particular case. They may be wrong, even badly wrong, but that is likely to be of inter-
est only to the parties. Accordingly, almost all states with developed laws of arbitration 
refuse to allow appeals from arbitral tribunals on issues of fact”2.
Numerous court decisions in comparative practice have taken a position 
against a de novo review of facts. This position received a convincing expla-
nation in a decision of the Swiss Supreme Court (Vekoma v. Maran) dealing 
with a challenge submitted against an ICC award rendered in Switzerland. The 
challenge was focusing on jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court held: 
“A decision pertaining to jurisdiction in international commercial arbitration may 
be reinvestigated freely by the Bundesgericht from a legal point of view, while with 
respect to facts review is only possible within the limits of substantial objections which 
claim that factual fi ndings result from non-observance of procedural guarantees set 
by law […], or they are incompatible with procedural ordre public”3.
In other words, the court cannot just displace the fact-fi nding of the arbi-
trators by way of substituting a fact-fi nding of its own. An exception is only 
permitted if the fact-fi nding mechanism (of the arbitrators) was tainted by 
1 K. Sajko, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Annulled Awards - A Dilemma, 7 
Croatian Arbitration Yearbook, 71 (2000) at p. 72.
2 A. Redfern and M. Hunter with N. Blakaby and C. Partasides, Law and Practice of In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration, 4th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2004, 505.
3 Transport en Handelsmaatschappij “Vekoma” B.V. (Netherlands) v. Maran Coal Corp 
(U.S.A.) Bundesgericht 1995 - English translation in Várady-Barcelo-Von Mehren, In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration - A Transnational Perspective, 4th Edition, West 
Publ. 2009, 796 - at pp. 798-799.
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non-observance of due process. At the same time, legal conclusions based on 
facts established by the arbitrators may, indeed, be reinvestigated, assuming 
that these conclusions are relevant from the perspective of the limited grounds 
for challenge enumerated in the relevant legislative act. Hence - in the light 
of the standards set by the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model 
Law - legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction may be reinvestigated, but legal 
conclusions regarding the merits may not (unless a violation of public policy 
were at stake). It is important to mention that in the Vekoma v. Maran case the 
issue was also raised whether the question which had to be decided was actually 
a question of law, or a question of fact. The problem arose from a somewhat 
idiosyncratic arbitration clause which stated that the dispute should be referred 
to arbitration “within thirty days after it was agreed that the difference or dis-
pute cannot be resolved by negotiation”4. The buyer (Maran) did initiate talks 
for settlement, but it was contested whether the seller rejected this initiative 
(and if it did, when rejection took place). In other words, the question arose 
whether arbitration was or was not initiated “within thirty days after it was 
agreed that the difference or dispute cannot be resolved by negotiations”. Both 
parties referred to the same pieces of correspondence, but they drew different 
conclusions. The Federal Tribunal (Supreme Court of Switzerland) reached a 
different conclusion from that reached by the arbitrators. The arbitrators held 
that arbitration was initiated within 30 days “after it was agreed that the dispute 
cannot be resolved by negotiations”. The Supreme Court held that the time limit 
of 30 days was infringed, and hence annulled the award for lack of jurisdiction. 
In the light of the position taken by the Swiss Supreme Court regarding law 
and facts, it was important whether the issue (whether 30 days did or did not 
lapse) would be qualifi ed as an issue of law or fact. The Supreme Court held 
that this was an issue of legal conclusion - and therefore it was perceived as 
being within the scope of possible court control of arbitral awards. 
In the Vekoma v. Maran case the Swiss Supreme Court did not consider any 
new pieces of evidence. Both the arbitrators and the Supreme Court relied on 
the same items of correspondence, but they drew different conclusions. The 
question arises what should a court do if a truly pertinent piece of evidence 
emerges as a newly discovered fact after the award was rendered. (Such a newly 
4 See about problems which may arise from such clauses, T. Várady, The Courtesy Trap 
- Arbitration “if no amicable settlement can be reached”, 14 Journal of International 
Arbitration, 5-12, 1997.
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discovered fact would, of course, be really important if it would call into doubt 
the validity of the award. A new fact lending added support to the award would 
not change the existing situation.) At this point, I would like to make a distinc-
tion between two types of situation. In the fi rst one, the newly discovered fact 
emerges at a moment when there is still time to start setting aside proceedings, 
or there is still an opportunity to oppose recognition and enforcement. In other 
words, when there is still time to submit the new fact within the setting of 
one of the two widely recognized variants of court control. The second type 
of situation is that in which a new fact would emerge at a point when setting 
aside proceedings were already completed (or the time limit for initiating set-
ting aside had run), and there are no recognition proceedings pending. As far 
as the fi rst type of situation is concerned, I would only like to make some very 
brief remarks within these introductory pages, and I would like to devote more 
attention in this paper to the second type of situation.
Relevant new facts may appear after the award was rendered, but before 
a challenge of the award took place. In this situation, the standard set by the 
Swiss Supreme Court appears to be reasonable and fi tting. The Swiss Supreme 
Court speaks of “review of facts”, which notion could encompass consideration 
of newly discovered facts. These could be considered if they relate to one of 
the possible grounds for challenge, and if the improper (or incomplete) fact-
fi nding by the arbitrators result from non-observance of procedural guarantees 
or violation of public policy.5
The question arises whether newly discovered facts could and should be 
heeded at a moment when the two generally accepted avenues of court control 
(setting aside and opposition to recognition and enforcement) are not accessible. 
Suppose an award denied jurisdiction due to absence of a written arbitration 
agreement. Should this award remain in force, if the arbitration agreement 
- which the claimant was unable to submit during the arbitral proceedings 
- emerges after the award was rendered, and after the time limit for seeking 
setting aside expired? Or, should an award tainted by fraud or bribery survive 
if such fraud or bribery was only discovered at a moment when it is too late 
to seek setting aside?
5 The Swiss Supreme Court speaks of procedural ordre public, but this is in the context 
of a challenge on the basis of jurisdiction. Taking into consideration all possible bases of 
challenge, public policy should not be restricted to procedural public policy.
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II. THE CHALLENGE OF THE UNKNOWN (THAT BECOMES 
KNOWN BELATEDLY) AND THE ISSUE OF A THIRD RECOURSE
There have been - and there will be - cases in which the truth about impor-
tant facts remains unknown until after a fi nal and binding decision has been 
rendered. The truth about these facts may surface later, when ordinary remedies 
are not available anymore. Different attitudes have been taken regarding such 
situations. Let me cite a position which could be qualifi ed as an extreme one. 
The New York Times devoted a half page to the story of a Texas judge (Ms 
Sharon Keller) who rejected new trial for Roy Criner convicted for rape and 
murder. Mr. Criner was awaiting death penalty when a DNA test showed that 
he was not the perpetrator. Judge Keller nevertheless rejected new trial, and 
explained her position in a TV interview: “We can’t give new trials to everyone who 
establishes, after conviction, that they might be innocent. […]We would have no fi nality 
in the criminal justice system, and fi nality is important”6.
Indeed, fi nality is a critically important element of any legal system - but 
there should be limits, even to fi nality. Considerations of rationality cannot be 
more important than human life. Finality simply cannot justify the execution 
of an innocent person.
But if it is easy to disagree with Judge Keller, it is way less easy to draw 
dividing lines within the realm of international commercial arbitration, where 
the losers do suffer, but are not threatened by death penalty, and do not go to 
prison; and where early fi nality is one of the major distinctive characteristics 
of the system.
Decision-makers are not always aware of all relevant facts. Sometimes, facts 
are withheld by one of the parties on purpose; there are also cases in which some 
facts are simply not known to any party at the time when a fi nal decision is 
reached. But what is unknown at the relevant time may become known later. A 
recurring tantalizing question is how to deal with belated information. Norms 
on court proceedings - including those referring to civil cases - will typically 
provide a remedy, a way of coping with the unknown (unknown, that is, at 
the right moment). New information may prompt revision, an extraordinary 
remedy that permits the taking into account of newly discovered facts subject 
to a number of conditions. Revision is a concept which is broadly accepted in 
6 G. Kovach, A Texas Judge, Accused of Misconduct, Draws Mixed Opinions on her Fair-
ness, New York Times, March 8, 2009, p. 16.
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comparative law (assuming decision-making by courts). A representative for-
mulation of revision as a transnational concept may be found in the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), which states in Article 61(1): 
“An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon 
the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, 
when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming 
revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.” 
Before the I.C.J., an application for revision may be submitted within six 
months from the discovery of the new fact, but not later than ten years from 
the date of the judgment (Articles 61(3) and 61 (4) of the Statute). 
The question is whether such a recourse is justifi ed in the domain of arbi-
tration. One of the most intrinsic features of arbitration is the absence of any 
appellate level.7 The award rendered by the arbitrators is fi nal. Limited court 
control may result in setting aside or refusal of recognition, but there are no 
extraordinary remedies which would bring about the reopening of the case 
in the light of newly discovered facts. The question is whether the specifi c 
features and structure of arbitration are compatible with a third recourse, an 
extraordinary remedy based on shifting boundaries between the known and 
the unknown.
In most legal systems revision has not been extended to arbitration proceed-
ings. Yet, there are some exceptions. In a few countries a limited ground was 
designed for recourses similar to revision; and in one country that has played 
an important role in the development of international commercial arbitration 
(Switzerland), revision has recently been recognized as a legitimate remedy 
against arbitral awards.
a) Instruments of control similar to revision 
i) Reconsideration or revocation in case of fraud
Before the enactment of the 1981 New Code of Civil Procedure, arbitral 
awards were subject in France to a multitude of recourses, including revision. 
7 Parties may, of course, design an appellate level, but this is almost never done, and insti-
tutional rules (with the notable exception of the ICSID Rules) normally do not provide 
for a second arbitral instance.
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One of the critically important achievements of the 1981 reform was the reduc-
tion of possible recourses to those two that are nowadays accepted in modern 
arbitration acts: a motion for setting aside, and opposition to recognition and 
enforcement. Prior to 1981, revision was essentially restricted to instances of 
fraud, and this remedy was available notwithstanding whether evidence of fraud 
became known before or after the expiration of the time limit for initiation of 
setting aside. As noted by Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, the abolition of 
this recourse proved to be controversial.8 Some commentators pointed out that 
the practical relevance of this recourse was small, but nevertheless, the majority 
view was that of regret that this option was discontinued by the 1981 reform.9 
The Cour de cassation opened the door, however, to a limited (and somewhat 
unclear) version of revision. In Fougerolle v. Procofrance, the Cour de cassation 
rejected a claim for revision, yet it held in a dictum that: 
“[i]l résulte des principes généraux du droit en matiére de fraude que, nonobstant 
l’exclusion du recours en révision par l’article 1507 du noveau Code de procedure 
civile, la rétractation d’une sentence rendue en France en matière d’arbitrage interna-
tional doit être exceptionellement admise en cas de fraude lorsque le tribunal arbitral 
demeure constitué après le prononcé de la sentence (ou peut à noveau être réuni)”10. 
As Fouchard et al. note, the Cour de cassation did not introduce a new recourse, 
but enabled the arbitrators themselves - at least where the arbitral tribunal 
could still be reconvened - to take into account newly surfaced evidence of 
which they were unaware as a result of fraud.11 
(The newest amendments to the French Code of Civil Procedure of January 
13, 2011 - effective from May 1, 2011 - deal with revision in Article 1502, 
which is applicable both to internal and to international arbitration. According 
to Article 1502, an application for revision can be made to the arbitral tribunal 
itself. It is added, however that “Toutefois, si le tribunal arbitral ne peut à nouveau 
être réuni, le recours est porté devant la cour d’appel qui eût été compétente pur connaître 
des autres recours contre la sentence.”)
A clearly articulated exception can be found in the 1986 Arbitration Act of 
the Netherlands (Book IV of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended through 
8 Ph. Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman, Traité de l’arbitrage commercial international, 
Paris, Litec 1996, 932.
9 Fouchard et al. op. cit. 932.
10 Fougerolle v. Procofrance, Cour de cassation, 1re civ. 25 mai 1992, reported in Revue de 
l’arbitrage, 1993, 91.
11 Fouchard et al. op. cit. 933.
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June 2004). A variant of revision is recognized by Article 1068 as one of the 
recourses against the arbitral award. According to Article 1068:
“Revocation of the award in case of fraud, forgery or new documents
1. Revocation of the award can take place only on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
(a) the award is wholly or partially based on fraud which is discovered after the 
award is made and which is committed during the arbitral proceedings by or 
with the knowledge of the other party;
(b) the award is wholly or partially based on documents which, after the award 
is made, are discovered to have been forged;
(c)  after the award is made, a party obtains documents which would have had 
an infl uence on the decision of the arbitral tribunal and which were withheld 
as a result of the acts of the other party.
2. An application for revocation shall be brought before the Court of Appeal which 
would have had jurisdiction to decide on an appeal relating to the application for 
setting aside mentioned in article 1064, in corresponding application of article 
1064(3) or if this will result in a later date within three months after the fraud 
or forgery has become known or the party has obtained the new documents. If the 
party that has reason to apply for revocation dies within the term mentioned in 
the fi rst sentence of this paragraph, article 341 shall apply accordingly. The pro-
ceedings are commenced with the issuance of a writ of summons in conformity with 
the requirements of article 111 and are conducted in the manner determined by 
Book One, Title Two. The provisions of article 1066 shall apply accordingly.
3. If the judge considers the ground(s) for revocation to be correct, he wholly or par-
tially sets aside the arbitral award. The provisions of article 1067 shall apply 
accordingly.”
Hence - similarly as in the French case - the remedy does not cover the full 
scope of revision, but it is essentially limited to fraud. According to the stand-
ard concept of revision in court proceedings, the remedy is available whenever 
“ignorance was not due to negligence” (and the newly discovered fact is rel-
evant). Fraud or bad faith of one of the parties make a stronger case, but do 
not represent an essential requirement. Under Article 1068 of the Dutch Act, 
revocation may be sought if the award is based on fraud or on forged documents. 
To these grounds a third one was added: if the newly discovered documents 
“were withheld as a result of the acts of the other party”. This formulation 
may extend to behavior which does not reach the level of fraud, but still, the 
wording implies bad faith (or at least negligence) of the other party. Hence, 
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the preconditions are somewhat more stringent than those of the traditional 
concept of revision, which only require that ignorance was not due to negligence 
of the party claiming revision.
ii) Collateral attack on the award 
Speaking of atypical recourses which are similar to revision, I would also 
like to mention a case which demonstrates a failed attempt. This attempt was 
qualifi ed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit as “collateral attack on 
the fi nal award”. In Gulf Petro,12 arbitration took place in Switzerland dealing 
with a dispute arising out of a joint venture agreement. On July 5, 2000, the 
arbitrators rendered a partial award fi nding that Petrec (a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Gulf Petro) had standing to pursue its claim, and that the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) had some obligations. In January 
2001, a hearing for determining the quantum of damages was held. At this 
hearing NNPC challenged jurisdiction based on Petrec’s lack of standing, and 
providing a copy of a Texas certifi cate of incorporation showing that Petrec 
International Inc. was only incorporated in Texas on February 28, 2000, well 
after the execution of the joint venture agreement, and after the submission 
of the demand for arbitration. On October 9, 2001, the arbitrators rendered a 
fi nal award holding that Petrec “lacked capacity to maintain its claims against 
NNPC.” Petrec challenged the fi nal award in Switzerland, but the Swiss court 
denied setting aside in April 2002. At this point, there was no remedy anymore. 
One of the possible recourses (a motion for setting aside) was relied upon, but 
the attempt failed. The other possible recourse (opposition to recognition and 
enforcement) was out of the question, since the winner in the arbitration pro-
ceedings had no interest in seeking recognition of the award denying jurisdiction 
- NNPC was satisfi ed that no obligation was imposed on it. 
Gulf Petro and Petrec tried to circumvent this situation, endeavoring to 
seek confi rmation (in the U.S.) of the fi rst partial award - the one which was 
later superseded by the fi nal award. The district court (Northern District of 
Texas) dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning 
12 Gulf Petro Trading Company Inc.; Petrec International Inc; James Faulk, and others 
v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Bola Ajibola and others, 512 F 3d 742 
(2008).
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that “[i]n seeking confi rmation of the Partial Award, Petrec was effectively requesting 
that the Final Award be set aside or modifi ed, actions that the court was precluded from 
taking…”13 After this action failed, Gulf Petro and Petrec attempted in 2005 
another collateral attack, by bringing an action reminiscent of revision in the 
Eastern District of Texas. This time the plaintiffs alleged that the Final Award 
was procured by fraud, bribery, and corruption, naming as defendants not 
only NNPC, but also a number of other persons, including the three arbitra-
tors. This action was also rejected for lack of jurisdiction. The district court 
concluded that “[G]ulf Petro’s entire complaint constituted a collateral attack on 
the Final Award that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain”14. The same 
position was taken by the Fifth Circuit. Judge King stressed: “Though cloaked 
in a variety of federal and state law claims, Gulf Petro’s complaint amounts to no more 
than a collateral attack on the Final Award itself ”15. The Fifth Circuit concluded 
that Gulf Petro’s claims were properly dismissed by the district court for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. Taking this position, the U.S. courts refused to 
open the gate for tactical maneuvers that may have seriously undermined the 
stability of arbitral decision making.
b) Revision as a possible third instrument of court control of arbitral 
awards
 
A distinct attitude was recently taken by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (the 
Supreme Court of Switzerland). Without an explicit foothold in Swiss legis-
lation, and without a basis in the 1987 Swiss Private International Law Act 
(hereinafter “Swiss PIL Act”) in particular, the Swiss Federal Tribunal created 
room for a third recourse against arbitral awards (in addition to setting aside 
and opposition to recognition and enforcement). This new option is revision, 
within its traditional meaning and scope. Revision was fi rst recognized only 
as a possibility in a decision of 11 March 1992.16 In a case in which company 
P. requested revision of an arbitral award, the Federal Tribunal took note of 
13 512 F3d 742, at 745.
14 512 F3d 742, 745.
15 512 F3d 742, 750.
16 Federal Tribunal, Decision No. 118 II 199 of 11 March 1992 - reported in Revue de 
l’Arbitrage [1993], 115.
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the fact that the Swiss PIL Act restricted the number of possible recourses 
against arbitral awards, and does not mention revision as a possible recourse. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Tribunal found that “such silence of the legislator 
does not bind the Court,” but represents a gap in the statute (“Gesetzeslücke,” 
“lacune de la loi”) which may be remedied by the court. The Federal Tribunal 
stressed that parties submitting their case to arbitration cannot be deemed to 
have accepted an award rendered under the infl uence of a crime, or by way 
of ignoring essential facts or decisive evidence.17 After it admitted revision as 
a matter of principle, the Federal Tribunal nevertheless denied the request, 
holding that the circumstance relied upon by the party seeking revision did 
not meet the requirements of Swiss law. It was only in a more recent August 
2006 case18 that the Federal Tribunal actually granted a request for revision. 
The facts of this case fi t perfectly into the general pattern of revision. During 
the arbitration proceedings, it was alleged that the purchase of shares was a 
part of a money laundering scheme. This allegation was considered relevant, 
but was not proven. An award was rendered on 16 August 2004.19 The losing 
party sought annulment in line with Article 190 of the Swiss PIL Act, but the 
Federal Tribunal denied the challenge on 14 December 2004.20 The request 
for revision relied on newly discovered evidence emerging from an affi davit of 
13 January 2006 submitted to the English Privy Council. It is important to 
point out that the applicant sought revision of the arbitral award, and not of 
the court decision denying annulment. The newly discovered facts were facts 
which already existed prior to the rendering of the arbitral award, but were not 
known to the applicant, and such ignorance was not due to negligence. The 
newly discovered facts were also of a decisive nature.21 These circumstances 
17 “Et malgré cette restriction au niveau des possibilités de recours, la partie qui accepte 
de se soumettre à un arbitrage ne s’accommodera pas pour autant d’une sentence in-
fl uencée par un crime ou un délit ou rendue dans l’ignorance de faits essentielles ou de 
preuves décisives.” (118.II.199), Revue de l’arbitrage 1993 No.1, p. 116.
18 Decision of the Federal Tribunal of 29 August 2006, 4P.102/2006/ruo.
19 Other awards were also rendered between the same parties, but it is the award of 16 
August 2004, which gave rise to revision.
20 Federal Tribunal 4P. 208/2004.
21 The Federal Tribunal explained this requirement by stating “Die neuen Tatsachen müs-
sen erheblich sein, dass heisst sie müssen geeignet sein die tatsächliche Grundlage des 
angefochtenen Urteils zu verändern, so dass sie bei zutreffender rechtlicher Würdigung 
zu einer anderen Entscheidung führen können.” (4P. 102/2006/ruo).
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satisfi ed the requirements of Article 137 of the Judicial Organization Act22 
which deals with revision of Supreme Court Judgments, and which was ap-
plied here by analogy. Revision was granted, and the case was sent back to the 
arbitrators for a new decision.  
After the doors were unlocked, the Swiss Supreme Court exercised caution 
in admitting requests for revision. A case decided between a party from Swit-
zerland and a party from Taiwan yielded a sequence of awards (and a sequence 
of court decisions). These sequences confronted the decision makers with some 
unconventional options. Revision against an interim award preceded a request 
for setting aside (of the fi nal award).  The arguments on which the request for 
revision and the (later) request for setting aside were based, were essentially 
the same. An interim award rendered on February 23, 2007 established that 
the consultancy agreement concluded between the Swiss and the Taiwanese 
fi rms was valid. In January 2008 - after the time limit for initiating setting 
aside lapsed - the Swiss party sought revision, alleging that the consultancy 
agreement was in fact an undertaking to commit bribery. This allegation was 
substantiated by new documents found in the archives of the party seeking 
revision. The Supreme Court had doubts as to whether the newly presented 
documents were of a decisive nature (“erheblich”). It also questioned whether 
the documents were admissible as “newly discovered facts,” and it found that 
they were not, since the documents were in the archives of the party seeking 
revision. The request for revision was denied by a decision of 14 March 2008.23 
After revision of the interim award was denied, the arbitrators rendered a fi nal 
award on December 19, 2008, obliging the Swiss party to pay a sum of about 
14 million Sfr. On February 2, 2009, the Swiss party sought setting aside of the 
fi nal award (within the time limit allowed). It submitted again the allegation 
that the actual subject matter of the consultancy agreement was bribery - and 
it relied again on documents discovered after the interim award was rendered. 
The interesting question arose whether the documents and allegations could 
have a treatment within the setting aside proceedings that were different from 
the treatment accorded within the process of revision. The Federal Tribunal held 
that as a matter of principle: “Im Bereich der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 
22 Replaced on 1 January 2007 by the Supreme Court Act - which retained the norms of 
the Judicial Organization Act regarding revision.
23 X. AG v. Y. AG, I. zivilrechtliche Abteilung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, 
14.III.2008, 26 ASA Bulletin [2008], 765-770.
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kann es die Sachverhaltsfestellungen des Schiedsgerichts weder auf Rüge hin überprüfen 
(...) noch von Amtes wegen berichtigen oder ergänzen (...)”24. The Claimant attempted 
to rely on an exception with a foothold in Article 99 of the Supreme Court 
Act, which gives an opportunity for the introduction of “Nova” in case the 
submission of new factual allegations was fi rst prompted by the decision of the 
earlier instance (Vorinstanz);  in the given case, the decision of the Vorinstanz 
was the arbitral award. The Federal tribunal held, however, that in the given 
case the nature and the validity of the consultancy agreement were already 
contested and debated during the arbitral proceedings proper. Hence, the fi rst 
opportunity was not triggered by the award; an opportunity to submit factual 
allegations regarding the nature and the validity of the consultancy agreement 
already existed before the award was rendered. The Federal Tribunal denied 
the motion to submit new factual allegations, and rejected the request for 
setting aside.
In another case dealing with a request for revision, decided on April 4, 2008, 
the Swiss Supreme Court again denied the request, holding that the “newly 
discovered facts” could have been ascertained before the award was rendered.25 
In this case, the party seeking revision alleged that the legal representative 
of the opposing party and one of the arbitrators were members of the same 
organization. The Supreme Court found that this information was available 
on the internet before the award of the CAS (Court of Arbitration for Sport) 
was rendered, hence it could not be qualifi ed as a newly discovered fact. If the 
facts were unknown to the party seeking revision, this was due to that party’s 
own negligence.
The diffi cult question prompted by allowing revision is whether this yields 
a pro-arbitration result. It is certainly in the interest of any decision-making 
process to maintain instruments which are capable of eliminating grave errors. 
In two of the Swiss cases referred to above, the newly emerging fact showed (or 
purported to show) bribery which tainted the relationship of the parties. One 
could also imagine that what was unknown and becomes (belatedly) known, 
was bribery involving one of the arbitrators themselves. The argument could 
be made that in egregious cases - like, for example, bribery - the basic integrity 
24 X. AG (Switzerland) v. Y. (Taiwan) Bundesgericht, Urteil vom 8. April 2009, I. zivilrecht-
liche Abteilung (4A.69/2009).
25 Club X v. Y S/A Brazil, I. zivilrechtliche Abteilung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, 
4.IV.2008 - 4A_528/2007.
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of the arbitration process requires some remedy. At the same time, the point 
can be made that revision is not the only conceivable instrument of rectifi ca-
tion in extreme situations. First of all, if bribery gets discovered, this may be a 
ground for setting aside under the shelter of public policy. Of course, a motion 
for setting aside is tied to a time limit which starts running from the day of 
rendering the award (rather than from the day of discovery of a new relevant 
fact). But it is also true that revision is typically conditioned by two time lim-
its: a shorter one counted from the date of discovery of the relevant fact, and 
a longer one counted from the date of the rendering of the decision. Hence, 
even revision will not give unconditional priority to the belatedly discovered 
truth; it just allows somewhat more time for the unknown to become known. 
Staying with the example of bribery, let me add that even after time limits have 
expired, sanctions against a corrupt arbitrator (or against a corrupt party) may 
be imposed in appropriate court proceedings; and the party against whom the 
corrupt award was rendered may possibly seek relief in a tort action.  (One has 
to add that this would not be a straight and simple way towards remedy.)
One also has to take into account that revision is also not just a simple way 
of giving relevance to some facts that were unknown when the award was ren-
dered. Revision implies an interpretation of preconditions that may be complex, 
and the outcome of the recourse may be hard to predict. We have seen in the 
Swiss cases that problems might arise in assessing whether the newly discovered 
fact is or is not of a decisive nature, and whether late discovery was or was 
not due to negligence. Let me add that in addition to questioning whether the 
fact submitted is really a new one and a decisive one, sometimes it is seriously 
questioned whether what was submitted was actually a fact. In the Vekoma 
v Maran case26, the Swiss Federal Tribunal came to the supposition that the 
issue at hand was an issue of legal assessment, rather than a question of fact. 
This qualifi cation allowed the Federal Tribunal to proceed with its analysis, 
and to set aside the award. In the context of revision, the distinction between 
law and facts is again a matter of frequent controversy, but the qualifi cations 
reached yield an opposite conclusion. Within the context of revision, one has 
to characterize an issue as a question of fact (rather than as a question of legal 
assessment) in order to be able to proceed with the recourse. Courts decid-
ing on requests of revision have often faced dilemmas such as, the question 
whether treaty membership or citizenship are facts or matters of legal quali-
26 See fn. 3.
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fi cation. In a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States27 the 
remedy was dependent on the question as to whether the fi nding of the lower 
court regarding a key issue was a fi nding of fact or a fi nding of law. It was held 
that the issue in question, namely whether “differential impact of a seniority 
system refl ected an intent to discriminate on account of race,” was a “question 
of fact”28. This may be a correct conclusion, but it is certainly not an obvious 
one. The problem is well captured in a 1924 decision of the French-German 
Mixed Tribunals, which stated:   
“Attendu que la notion de fait ne doit pas être mise en opposition absolue avec celle 
de droit dont il n’est pas toujours facile de la distinguer, mais qu’elle doit s’entendre 
d’une façon plus large (…)” 29.
The point is that revision is a quite complex instrument. It is not just a 
simple vehicle of transmission of newly discovered facts to the original deci-
sion-makers; it may also become a playground for intricate arguments focusing 
on its own prerequisites.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING THE OPTION OF A 
THIRD RECOURSE
The reasons why some facts remain unknown are multifaceted. The focus of 
this paper is, of course, on legal reasons that may keep a fact beyond the reach 
of the decision-makers. The characteristics and the interests of international 
commercial arbitration are putting some manifestations of the unknown into 
a specifi c light; some arguments are gaining added strength, while other argu-
ments are losing relevance.
Revision is an instrument that allows the decision-maker to change positions 
in line with the changing borders between the known and the unknown. This 
is, of course, appealing, although the need for fi nality inspires arguments in the 
opposite direction. Within the setting of international commercial arbitration, 
some specifi c points of view emerge. The introduction of a third recourse (in 
addition to a motion for setting aside and opposition to recognition) opens 
27 Pullman-Standard v. Louis Swint and Willie Johnson etc., 456 U.S. 273, 102 
S.Ct.1781.
28 456 U.S. 273, at p. 274.
29 Heim et Chamant c. Etat allemand, R.D.T.A.M. III, 50, at p. 55.
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diffi cult questions. It is not easy to make a choice between the juxtaposed 
considerations. If we accept revision as an option, we shall have an additional 
instrument for securing a just fi nal outcome. At the same time, certain com-
parative advantages of arbitration - like the fi nality of the awards - will be 
impaired. Also, being subject to an extraordinary recourse normally available 
only against court decisions rendered in the forum State, arbitral awards will 
become a part of the judicial system of the country of their origin in a more 
pronounced way - which may very well generate controversies. The question 
also arises as to what would be the impact of revision on consistency on an 
international scale. Could a successful revision have an impact on recognition 
already granted in a foreign country? The answer is probably negative, unless 
the country in which recognition was granted would allow another revision 
(this time against the court decision granting recognition). Let me add that the 
UNCITRAL Model Law does not contemplate revision as a possible recourse 
against arbitral awards (neither the 1985 text, nor the 2006 Amendments). 
The dangers opened by a third recourse might outweigh its benefi ts.
Saæetak
Tibor Várady*
KONTROLA PRAVORIJEKA I VAÆNOST 
NOVOOTKRIVENIH »INJENICA
Uvijek je bilo i bit Êe sluËajeva u kojima istina o nekim vaænim Ëinjenicama ostaje 
nepoznata i nakon donoπenja konaËne odluke. Dogaa se da se istina otkrije, ali tek kada 
viπe ne postoji moguÊnost oslanjanja na redovite pravne lijekove. Prema ovom problemu 
zauzeta su razliËita stajaliπta. Uvoenje treÊeg pravnog sredstva (pored poniπtaja i 
protivljenja priznanju arbitraænog pravorijeka) otvara sloæena pitanja. Izbor izmeu 
suprotstavljenih opcija nije jednostavan. TreÊe pravno sredstvo uobliËavano je u vidu 
ponovnog razmatranja nakon otkriÊa prijevare, kolateralnog osporavanja pravorijeka te 
revizije. Meu tim opcijama najvaænija je revizija - a πvicarska praksa donijela je jednu 
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paæljivu (i opreznu) razradu ove opcije. Ako se prihvati revizija, dobivamo dodatni 
instrument za osiguravanje pravednog ishoda. Istodobno, neke komparativne prednosti 
arbitraænog rjeπavanja sporova - prije svega konaËnost pravorijeka - bit Êe ugroæene. 
Nadalje, ako se protiv arbitraænog pravorijeka mogu podnijeti pravni lijekovi koji su 
inaËe dostupni samo kod osporavanja sudskih odluka dræave foruma, arbitraæni pravorijek 
postaje na naglaπeniji naËin dio pravnog sistema dræave podrijetla - πto moæe izazvati 
sporove. Postavlja se pitanje kakav je utjecaj revizije na konzistentnost na meunarodnom 
planu. Moæe li uspjeπna revizija arbitraænog pravorijeka dovesti u pitanje priznanje o 
kojem je veÊ odluËeno u odreenoj zemlji. Vjerojatno ne, osim ako se u zemlji u kojem je 
pravorijek priznat dopusti joπ jedna revizija (ovom prilikom protiv odluke o priznanju). 
Vaæno je napomenuti i to da UNCITRAL-ov model-zakon ne svrstava reviziju meu 
moguÊa pravna sredstva protiv arbitraænog pravorijeka. Rizici koje otvara treÊe pravno 
sredstvo vjerojatno su veÊi od koristi.
KljuËne rijeËi: nove Ëinjenice, sudski nadzor pravorijeka, sporedno osporavanje kon-
aËnosti pravorijeka, revizija

